Hot SourceJohn Solomon
As Sudan’s civil war drags into its third year, it has become more than a contest between two generals. The confrontation between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, now stands as the symbol of a deeper struggle: one that fuses ideology, geopolitics and the battle for influence across the region.
Since April 2023, Sudan has been collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions. What began as a struggle for control between the army and a powerful paramilitary faction has evolved into a war of alignments, where regional and international powers pursue competing visions of order.
A battlefield of overlapping ambitions
The Sudanese Armed Forces remain closely connected to certain ideological and regional networks, including currents historically associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and have drawn varying degrees of support from Egypt, Turkey, Iran and, increasingly, Russia. This constellation reflects a return to the old grammar of ideological solidarity and strategic access, Islamist in character, authoritarian in practice. Opposite them, the Rapid Support Forces operate through a looser tribal, economic and cross-border system, linked to informal markets stretching across Darfur and the Sahel.
This fracture has turned Sudan into a geopolitical mirror: on one side, a model of the militarised, Islamo-nationalist state; on the other, a form of fragmented pragmatism seeking to integrate into a more open regional order. Around it, the wider Red Sea and Horn of Africa corridors have become the fault lines where Arab and African ambitions converge, from Cairo’s bid to reassert its Nile dominance to Ankara’s neo-Ottoman outreach and Tehran’s re-entry via military assistance.
Within this dense web of rivalries, the United Arab Emirates are often mentioned, sometimes cautiously, sometimes accusatorily, as a power with interests to protect, if not to pursue. Yet the way their presence is discussed often reflects inherited perceptions and outdated analytical reflexes, rather than an accurate reading of their evolving regional strategy.
The false trail of resource politics
Accusations of Emirati interference in Sudan are not new. They belong to a familiar repertoire of analysis: a country at war, endowed with mineral wealth, and an external actor whose resources are assumed to seek extraction and influence. Yet such narratives often say more about the frameworks through which observers interpret African conflicts than about the evidence itself.
Across the continent, the record tells a different story. In Kenya, a 1.5-billion-dollar loan has supported economic recovery and large-scale infrastructure works. In Nigeria, the Dubai International Chamber’s office in Lagos has formalised trade and investment exchanges between West Africa and the Gulf. In the Central African Republic, a 50-megawatt solar plant under construction will soon supply power to more than 300,000 households. In South Africa, a joint space programme illustrates a form of cooperation driven by technology rather than territory.
Taken together, these examples point to a pattern of engagement centred on infrastructure, trade and connectivity. They do not erase complexity, but they suggest a preference for long-term, commercially grounded partnerships over short-term strategic manoeuvres. Can such a trajectory easily be reconciled with the idea of a state seeking advantage in chaos? Or does the persistence of that narrative reflect the difficulty of seeing influence when it is exercised through stability rather than disruption?
A need for stability
Three priorities underpin this approach. First, the containment of political Islam, seen not only as a security threat but as an obstacle to modern statehood. Second, the protection of maritime routes linking the Gulf to East and West Africa, ensuring the security of global trade arteries through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Third, the construction of networks of interdependence (ports, railways, digital corridors) that stabilise regions by making disruption unprofitable.
In this sense, the UAE’s African policy represents a wider transformation of Gulf diplomacy. It moves away from the zero-sum logic of spheres of influence towards a system of shared logistics and capital flows. The partnership agreements signed with Mauritius and Kenya, the ministerial platforms established with Uganda, Cameroon and Chad, and the recurring investments in renewable energy and infrastructure all belong to this continuum.
Can a state whose diplomatic brand is built on predictability truly benefit from turmoil? Seen from this vantage point, the notion that Abu Dhabi would seek advantage in Sudan’s collapse appears increasingly inconsistent with the broader logic of its engagement. Instability undermines everything on which the Emirati model rests: connectivity, trust and the reputation of reliability that makes their diplomacy effective.
Sudan as a mirror of transformation
Ultimately, Sudan’s war tells two stories at once. The first is that of a country imploding under the weight of its own contradictions, its institutions hijacked by rival networks of power. The second is that of a region in transition, one where the parameters of influence are being rewritten.
While some actors cling to ideological alignments or spheres of control, others pursue influence through endurance: the patient construction of partnerships, infrastructure and financial ecosystems that bind rather than dominate. In this new order, the ability to impose matters less than the ability to connect.
The Emirates, whether praised or criticised, illustrate the gradual redefinition of power in the region. Their strategy is not without ambition, but it unfolds over time, seeking stability not as an end in itself, but as the condition for continuity. Sudan, by contrast, stands as a stark reminder of how fragmentation can consume the very foundations of statehood. Yet no regional actor is entirely insulated from its tremors. Might the networks of trade and cooperation now shaping Africa and the Gulf prove resilient enough to absorb such shocks? The logic of influence through confrontation appears to be receding, giving way to a quieter, more structural dynamic; — one measured less by assertion than by endurance.
· Mr. Solomon, a Public Analyst, writes from Nigeria
